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Abstract 
 
We use a newly assembled sample of 1,503 regions from 82 countries to compare the speed of per 
capita income convergence within and across countries.  Regional growth is shaped by similar factors as 
national growth, such as geography and human capital.  Regional convergence is about 2.5% per year, not 
more than 1% per year faster than convergence between countries.   Regional convergence is faster in richer 
countries, and countries with better capital markets.  A calibration of a neoclassical growth model suggests 
that significant barriers to factor mobility within countries are needed to account for the evidence.     
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1. Introduction 
  Since the fundamental work of Barro (1991), the question of convergence of income levels between 
countries has received enormous attention (Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin 1995, Caselli, Esquivel and 
Lefort 1996, Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes 2005, Barro 2012).  Several papers also analyze convergence 
between regions of the same country, as in the case of Japanese prefectures, Canadian provinces, Australian 
regions, Russian regions, or U.S. states (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991, 1992, 1995, Blanchard and Katz 1992, 
Cashin 1995, Coulombe and Lee 1995, Sala-i-Martin 1996, Ganong and Shoag 2012, Guriev and Vakulenko 
2012, Spilimbergo and Che 2012), but data availability has limited this kind of exercises.  In this paper, we 
systematically study regional convergence by using a large sample of sub-national regions.  To this end, we 
expand the dataset from Gennaioli et al. (2013) by collecting time-series data on regional GDP.  We end up 
with data on 1,503 regions in 82 countries.  We then analyze the patterns of convergence among regions 
and compare them to convergence across countries. 
There is substantial inequality among regions of the same country that needs to be understood.   In 
Brazil, which is typical in terms of regional inequality, the mean (median) region has per capita income in 
2009 of about US $ 6,400 (US $5,000), and the standard deviation of regional GDP per capita is $3,000.  In 
the average country in our dataset, the richest region is 5.2 times richer than the poorest one (roughly the 
difference between the US and the Dominican Republic), but sometimes differences are more extreme.  For 
example, GDP per capita in the richest Mexican state, Campeche, is  16.4 times higher than that in the 
poorest, Chiapas, a difference that is roughly similar to that between US and Pakistan in 2010.  If we avoid 
extremely poor regions, which typically have small populations, and extremely rich regions, which typically 
have natural resources, inequality within countries is lower but still substantial.  Moreover, poor countries 
display greater dispersion of regional GDP levels than rich countries.  The average standard deviation of (log) 
per capita income in the 20 poorest countries is 1.74 times larger than the average dispersion of per capita 
income in the 20 richest countries (40% vs 24%).  
Because these income differences summarize past growth trajectories, understanding the speed of 
regional convergence can shed light on the persistence of regional inequality.  Going back to the example of 3 
 
Brazil, if a region one standard deviation below the median catches up at Barro’s “iron law” rate of 2% per 
year, it will need almost half a century to catch up with the median.  In the meantime, inequality will persist. 
So, what is the speed of regional convergence?  How does it compare to the speed of convergence between 
countries?  What factors determine it?  Is it consistent with patterns of regional inequality?  Our data allows 
us to systematically address these four questions.      
The focus on regional convergence also allows us to better assess the explanatory power of the 
neoclassical  growth model.  The estimates of cross-country  convergence  rates  are  potentially  subject  to 
severe omitted variable problems, owing to large heterogeneity between countries. This problem may be 
less severe in the case of subnational regions, which are more homogeneous than countries in terms of 
productivity, institutions, and access to technology. 
To organize the discussion, we present a neoclassical model of regional growth related to the earlier 
work of Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Braun (1993), and Ganong and Shoag (2012).  To account 
for persistent disparities in regional incomes, we incorporate into the model a stylized process of mobility of 
human and physical capital from regions where it is abundant to regions where it is scarce subject to an 
exogenous mobility friction.  This model generates a modified growth equation, which predicts that the 
speed of regional convergence decreases in the severity of that mobility friction.  The model also predicts 
that a region’s per capita income growth should rise with country-level income to an extent that increases in 
factor mobility.  Indeed, a region can attract more capital, and thus grow faster, if it is integrated into a 
richer country.  Both of these predictions of the model are new and empirically testable.  
When we estimate the growth equation derived from the model, we find that doubling country-level 
income increases regional growth by about 1.5%.  We estimate regional convergence to be about 2.5% per 
year,  slightly  higher  than  the  “iron  law”  rate  of  2%  advocated  by  Barro  (2012).    This  estimate  is  not 
substantially affected by country fixed effects.  This finding is somewhat puzzling.  Barriers to the mobility of 
human and physical capital are arguably important across countries (Lucas 1990), but their role would a 
priori seem to be smaller within countries.  This would imply, contrary to what we find, a much faster 
convergence rate within than between countries.  To better interpret our regional findings, we  directly 4 
 
estimate cross country convergence in our sample.  We find that the speed of national GDP per capita 
convergence is slightly faster than 1%.   On the one hand, this is significantly slower, by about 1.5 percentage 
points,  than  the  regional  convergence  rate,  consistent  with  the  basic  prediction  that  barriers  to  factor 
mobility are higher between than within countries.  On the other hand, the difference is not that big.   
To  compare  our  findings  to  Barro’s  (2012)  directly,  we  also  estimate  our  equation  for  regional 
growth using instrumental variables, with lagged GDP serving as an instrument for current GDP, which might 
be measured with error.  The estimated regional convergence rate falls to 1.7%, but due to decline in sample 
size, not the use of IV.  Nor can the finding that regional convergence is broadly comparable to national 
convergence be due to the omitted variables problem, which is surely less severe at the regional than at the 
national level.  Omitted variables should if anything cause a relative overstatement of regional convergence.  
Contrary to the view that factors are significantly more mobile within than across countries, this evidence 
suggests that mobility (and thus convergence) often  limited in both cases.  Indeed, when we map our 
estimated coefficients into the parameters of our model, they point to rather slow mobility of capital in 
response  to  within-country  return  differentials.    The  five-year  elasticity  of  migration  to  regional  return 
differentials implied by our model is about 2.  With nearly perfect mobility, our model predicts a much 
higher elasticity.    
Motivated by this evidence, we focus empirically on limited within country resource mobility and try 
to assess whether it can indeed account for regional growth patterns.  To measure limited mobility, one 
would  ideally  look  at  regional  differences  in  goods  prices and  factor  returns.  These  differences  would 
capture both the intrinsic non-tradeability of some factors or goods, such as land and housing, and the 
presence of man-made barriers to mobility.
2  Unfortunately, the scarcity of data on regional prices prevents 
us from looking at price differentials.  A feasible alternative is to dire ctly look at the  barriers to regional 
mobility of resources caused by non-integrated markets at the national level. To implement this approach, 
                                                           
2 Different limits to mobility have important consequences for welfare. In the case of non-tradeability of certain locally 
produced goods, such as housing, perfect mobility of labor would suffice to equalize the living standards of workers 
across regions (as differences in price levels would offset nominal income differences).  Barriers to mobility of labor 
would in contrast entail differences in the living standards of workers across regions.  In our analysis, we try to directly 
measure potential regulatory barriers to mobility and look at migration of productive factors.  5 
 
we  run  regional  convergence  regressions  by  interacting  regional  GDP  with  proxies  for  national  market 
institutions as well as government transfers.  This allows us to analyze country-level correlates of the speed 
of regional convergence.  Regional convergence is faster in richer countries, consistent with the latter having 
lower regional inequality.  Regional convergence is also faster in countries with better-regulated capital 
markets.   However, even the statistically significant determinants of the speed of convergence do not move 
the convergence rate much beyond Barro’s “iron law”. 
We also collect direct evidence – for a small subsample of countries – on the share of employees, as 
well as of skilled employees, that are recent migrants.  We show that these shares are on average rather 
small, consistent with limited mobility of human capital.  However, in-migration is also faster into richer 
regions and in countries with better-regulated capital markets, consistent with our model.    
As a final robustness check, we consider fixed effects estimates of growth regressions.  From cross 
country studies, it is well known that fixed effect estimation boosts the speed of convergence.   In our 
sample of countries, the introduction of country fixed effects in cross-country regressions increases national 
convergence rates by roughly 2 percentage points.  If we include regional fixed effects in our regional growth 
regressions, the speed of convergence rises substantially, by anywhere from 2 to 9 percentage points.  These 
differences notwithstanding, it is still the case that substantial within-country mobility barriers are required 
to make sense of the data.  We concur with Barro (2012) that fixed effects estimates likely lead to a large 
Hurwicz bias, particularly at the sub-national level, where the omitted variable problem is much less severe.  
We therefore rely on OLS estimates.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 lays out a model of regional convergence and migration.   
Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 estimates the model’s equations governing regional convergence, 
and its dependence on country-level factors.  Section 5 interprets the model in light of the empirical findings.  
Section 6 concludes.  
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2. The Model 
We present a model of convergence across regions that explicitly takes into account barriers to 
factor mobility.  Time is discrete          .  A country consists of a measure one of regions, indexed by 
    [   ] and characterized by regional total factor productivity (TFP)    and an initial per capita capital 
endowment   ̂   .  Capital here is a broad construct, combining human and physical inputs (we do not have 
data on regional physical capital).  We distinguish a region’s time t capital endowment   ̂    from the amount 
of capital      employed at time   in the same region.  The two will tend to differ owing to capital mobility.     
If  at  time     region     employs  an  amount        of  capital  per-capita,  its  output  per  capita        is 
determined by a diminishing returns Cobb-Douglas technology: 
             
                                                                                  
Regions with higher    are more productive, owing for instance to better geography or institutions. 
The competitive remuneration of capital is then equal to                
   .  Under perfect mobility, this 
remuneration is equalized across regions, which implies: 
    
         ̂                                                                                          
where   ̂   
  
 
   
∫  
 
     
 captures region  ’s relative TFP and      ∫  ̂      is the aggregate human capital in the 
country.    Intuitively,  return  equalization  occurs  when  relatively  more  productive  regions  employ  more 
capital than less productive ones.  In general, however, capital mobility costs prevent return equalization.   
 
2.1 Migration and Human Capital Accumulation 
To close the model, we must specify how human capital evolves over time, both in the aggregate 
and across regions.  To obtain closed form solutions, in our main specification we assume that human capital 
depreciates fully in one period and that population growth is zero.  When we interpret our estimates, we 
also consider a model with capital depreciation and population growth, which we analyze in Appendix 2.  In 
the spirit of the Solow model, we assume that at time   region   invests an exogenous share   of income in 
education.  The human capital endowment of region i at time       is then equal to: 7 
 
  ̂                       
                                                                                      
 The aggregate human capital endowment at time       is then ∫  ̂                  ∫      
    .  
The link between the initial capital endowment   ̂      and employment        depends on migration. 
Migration occurs after new capital is created but before production. If mobility costs are infinite, each region 
employs its endowment, so that            ̂     .  If mobility is perfect, the remuneration of human capital is 
equalized across regions and, by Equation (2),            ̂        .  To capture in a tractable way intermediate 
degrees of mobility, we assume that the human capital employed in region   at time       is given by: 
                (  ̂     )
 
(  ̂        )
   
                                                                    
where     [   ] and       
    
 
∫(  ̂     )
 
   ̂        is a normalization factor common to all regions. 
In equation (4), parameter   proxies for mobility costs 
3.   At      , these costs are so high that there 
is  no mobility  at  all.    At      ,  these  costs  are  absent and  the  allocation of  capital  adjusts  so  that  its 
remuneration is equalized across regions.  In less extreme cases, there is an intermediate degree of mobility 
(and thus of convergence in returns).  Equation (4) is admittedly ad-hoc, but it allows us to tractably account 
for the costs of capital mobility in the regressions.  
 
2.2 Steady State and Growth Regressions 
We can now explore the dynamics of our economy to derive the implications for growth regressions.  
Equation (1) implies that the growth rate of region   between times t and       is given by              
(           )
 
  Per capita income growth is pinned down by per capita human capital employment growth 
(i.e., post migration).  From Equations (3) and (4), we can derive per capita capital growth: 
      
    
             
              (  ̂        ∫      
    )
   
                                             
The growth rate of capital employment in region   increases in: i) the savings rate  , ii) the region’s TFP, iii) 
aggregate investment     ∫      
     .  This growth rate decreases, due to diminishing returns, in the initial 
                                                           
3 In this one-good model, there is no trade in goods across regions, but in a multi-goods model of Hecksher-Ohlin type, 
imperfect capital mobility would be isomorphic to imperfect trade in goods.     8 
 
capital  stock      .  The  dynamics  of  the  economy  are  identified  by  the  evolution  of  the  regions’  capital 
endowment and migration patterns. These in turn determine the evolution of the aggregate human capital 
endowment    and output      ∫      
    .  The appendix proves the following result: 
 
Proposition 1 There is a unique steady state characterized by (non-zero) regional per capita incomes    
    
and aggregate per capita income      ∫  
    .  In this steady state, there is no migration.  Starting from non-
zero income, each region converges to this steady state according to the difference equation:    
      
    
           
           ̂
 
             
         
                                                          
 
According to Proposition 1, per-capita income  growth is temporary because diminishing returns 
cause regional incomes to eventually converge to their steady state values.  In Appendix 2, we extend 
Equation (6) to the case of positive population growth and finite depreciation, which reduces per capita 
growth as in the standard Solow model. 
  By taking logs and relabeling terms, we can rewrite (6) as: 
  (
      
    
)                                                                                       
where        is a random shock hitting region   at time      .
4  This is our main estimating equation. 
The constant    in Equation (7) captures region specific productivity: more productive regions should 
ceteris  paribus  grow  faster.  Indeed,  according  to  the  model,       [                   ]      ,  which 
increases in the region’s TFP.  This implies that, unless all determinants of productivity are controlled for, 
OLS  estimation  of  (7)  is  subject  to  an  omitted  variables  problem  that  creates  a  downward  bias  in  the 
estimated convergence rate. This problem is severe in the context of cross country growth regressions, 
owing to large cross country differences in institutions, culture, etc.  To overcome this difficulty, researchers 
have tried to use fixed effects estimates.  It is however well known that this strategy creates a potentially 
severe opposite Hurwicz (1950) bias (especially in short time series), overstating the rate of convergence.  
Because of this bias, Barro (2012) and others prefer estimating cross country growth regression without 
                                                           
4 We view this random shock as stemming from a transitory (multiplicative) shock to regional productivity    .  9 
 
country fixed effects.  In the sub-national context, the case for not using regional fixed effects is much 
stronger than in cross country regressions (after country fixed effects are controlled for).  Indeed, differences 
in institutions or culture are arguably small within countries and in any event much smaller than between 
countries.    Accordingly,  the  bias  from  using  fixed  effects  is  much  larger  at  the  regional  level.    As  a 
consequence, our preferred estimates for Equation (7) use OLS with country fixed effects.  We however 
show how the results change when we use regional fixed effects. 
According to equation (7), holding regional productivity constant, economic growth decreases in the 
initial level of income (recall that       ).  This is the standard convergence result of neoclassical models, 
due  to  diminishing  returns.  The  novel  twist  is  that  the  speed  of  convergence            decreases  with 
mobility costs (i.e. decreases in  ).  Mobility of capital to poorer regions accelerates convergence. Finally, 
holding regional income constant, regional growth increases in aggregate per capita income   .  This is also 
an implication of mobility: higher national income increases investment and thus the amount of capital 
available for employment in the region. The strength          of this effect falls in  . In Section 5, we discuss 
how the interpretation of coefficients changes with conventional population growth and depreciation rates.   
These effects are absent in conventional cross country studies because mobility costs are assumed to 
be prohibitive (     ).  Of course, the quantitative relevance of capital mobility costs in a regional context is 
an empirical question, and the estimation of Equation (7) can shed light on these barriers to capital mobility.   
The  mobility  parameter     may  vary  across  countries,  owing  to  differences  in  factor  market 
development and government transfers. We thus estimate Equation (7) by also allowing   to vary across 
countries c = 1,…,C according to the formula                , where    is a proxy capturing the extent of 
factor market development or government transfers in country c and       is a parameter linking that proxy 
to the effective mobility cost.  This leads to the interactive equation:   
  (
      
    
)                                                                                                 
To  assess  the  role  of  market  development  or  government  transfers  in  affecting  regional 
convergence, we pick several empirical proxies    for each of these factors and then estimate Equation (8) 10 
 
to back out parameters   and  .  We can then link the speed of convergence to the inequality of regions 
within a country.  By equation (8), and assuming that all regions (in all countries) are subject to the same 
variance     of  the  random  shock  and  that  productivity  differences  induce  a  variance  of  region-specific 
constants equal to  , we can calculate that long run inequality across regions within a country c obeys: 
   (      )  
     
                                                                                    
Regional inequality is lower in countries with lower barriers to regional factor mobility (i.e. with higher   ). 
Finally, we conclude the theoretical analysis by mapping our mobility parameter   into the elasticity 
of migration to return differentials. To do so, suppose that the economy is in a steady state with return   
and region   experiences a drop in its wage level to       .  This situation represents a developed economy 
that  has  already  converged  but  faces  an  adverse  shock  in  one  region.  Starting  from  an  initial  factor 
endowment     , out migration adjusts the actual resources stock to   , to satisfy:  
  (
  
    
)    
     
     
    (
 
    
)    
      
     
    (
 
    
)                                        
Equation (10) characterizes the percentage outmigration flow from region   as a function of the return 
differential.  The coefficient 
   
    has the intuitive interpretation of “elasticity of outmigration” to the return 
difference       .  For given  , elasticity increases in  : when returns are less diminishing, under perfect 
mobility capital is allocated more unequally.  This boosts mobility in Equation (4) and thus the elasticity of 
migration in Equation (10).  Our regional regressions provide values for the parameters   and   that can be 
used to obtain a reference value for the elasticity in (10).  This reference value can be compared to direct 
estimates obtained from developed economies to evaluate whether our regressions are  consistent with 
higher mobility frictions in developing countries. 
 
3. Data 
Our analysis is based on measures of regional GDP, years of schooling, and geography in up to 1,503 
regions in 82 countries for which we found regional GDP data.  We begin by gathering GDP data at the most 
disaggregated administrative division available (typically states or provinces), or, when such data does not 11 
 
exist, at the most disaggregated statistical division level (e.g. the Eurostat NUTS in Europe) for which such 
data is available.  During our sample period (see below), the number of regions with GDP data increased in 
35 of the countries in our sample.  For example, GDP data for the three Northwest Territories of Canada (i.e. 
Nova Scotia, Nunavut, and Yukon) was reported as an aggregate before 1998 and broken down for each of 
the 3 territories after that.  To make the data comparable across time, we compute all of our statistics for 
the regions that existed during the period when GDP first became available (see the online Appendix 1 for a 
list of the regions in our dataset and how they map into existing administrative and statistical divisions).  
Figure 1 shows that our sample coverage is extensive outside of Africa.   
We collect as much yearly data on regional GDP as possible.  Table 1 lists the years for which we 
have been able to find regional GDP data and shows that typically there are gaps in the data.  For example, 
regional GDP for Brazilian states is available for 1950-1966, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985-2009. The average 
country in our sample has regional GDP data for 19.2 time points spanning 32.3 years.   We first convert all 
regional GDP data into (current purchasing power) USD values by multiplying national GDP in PPP terms by 
the share of each region in national GDP and then use regional population to compute per capita GDP in 
each region.  Regional price deflators are generally unavailable.  We then follow the standard practice and 
compute the 5-year growth rate of per capita GDP for each region (e.g., Barro 2012).   
Next we gather data on the highest educational attainment of the population 15 years and older, 
primarily from population censuses (see online Appendix 2 for a list of sources).  We estimate the number of 
years of schooling associated with each level of educational attainment.  Specifically, we use UNESCO data 
on the duration of primary and secondary school in each country and assume: (a) zero years of school for the 
pre-primary level, (b) 4 additional years of school for tertiary education, and (c) zero additional years of 
school for post-graduate degrees.  We do not use data on incomplete levels because it is only available for 
about half of the countries in the sample.  For example, we assume zero years of additional school for the 
lower secondary level.  For each region, we compute average years of schooling as the weighted sum of the 
years  of  school  required  to  achieve  each  educational  level,  where  the  weights  are  the  fraction  of  the 
population aged 15 and older that has completed each level of education.    12 
 
Table  1  lists  the  years  for  which  we  have  data  on  educational  attainment.      Data  on  years  of 
schooling is typically available at ten year intervals.  In some cases, data on educational attainment starts 
after regional GDP data.  For example, data on regional educational attainment for Argentinian provinces 
starts in 1970 while regional GDP data is available for 1953.  In our empirical work, we use interpolated data 
on years of schooling matching 80% (25,383/31,705) of the region-year observations with regional GDP.   
Finally we collect data on geography, natural resources, and the disease environment as proxies for 
unobserved differences in productivity.  The Appendix describes the variables in detail, here we summarize 
them briefly.  We use three measures of geography computed directly from GIS maps. They include the area 
of each region, the latitude for the centroid of each region, and the (inverse) average distance between cells 
in a region and the nearest coastline.  We use data from the USGS World Petroleum Assessment Data to 
estimate per capita cumulative oil and gas production.  We measure the disease environment using GIS data 
on the dominant vector species of mosquitoes from Kisezewski et al. (2004) to capture the component of 
malaria variation that is exogenous to human intervention.   Lastly, we keep track of the region of the 
country’s capital city.  
Table 2 presents a full list of the 82 countries in the sample, with the most recent year for which we 
have regional data. The countries are listed in the order from poorest to richest.  Table 2 also reports per 
capita regional income in the poorest, 25
th percentile, 50
th percentile, 75
th percentile, and the richest region 
in each country, as well as the ratio of richest to poorest, and 75
th to 25
th percentile regions.  Several points 
come out in the data.  First, if we look across countries, inequality is immense.  The 2010 GDP per capita of 
Norway, the richest country in our sample, is 55 times higher than that of Mozambique, the poorest.  Even in 
the middle of the distribution there is substantial inequality among countries.  The 2010 GDP per capita in 
Spain, at the 75
th percentile, is 6.3 times higher than that of Paraguay, at the 25
th percentile.  Second, 
inequality is smaller but still substantial within countries.  At the extreme, in Venezuela, the 1990 GDP per 
capita  in  Falcón  is  46  times  higher  than  that  in  Trujillo  ($21,422  vs  $466).    To  put  this  difference  in 
perspective, Trujillo is not much richer than Liberia, the poorest African country at that time, and Falcón is 
similar to Mississippi, the poorest US state.  Similar patterns of inequality show up in Russia, Mexico, and 13 
 
other countries with extremely wealthy mining and exploration regions.  Using the Theil index to measure 
inequality, it is possible to compare the extent of regional inequality to country-level inequality.  The Theil 
population-weighted index of inequality of GDP per capita is .54, of which .45 can be attributed to between 
country inequality, and .09 to within-country regional inequality.  Put differently, within-country regional 
inequality explains roughly 10% of total world income inequality.  Although country-level inequality takes the 
lion’s share, regional inequality is substantial even from the vantage point of world income inequality.   
Third, inequality within countries is much lower if we compare 75
th and 25
th percentile regions.  In 
Venezuela, the ratio of incomes in 75
th and 25
th percentile regions is only 2.8; it is 1.7 in Russia and 1.6 in 
Mexico.  Clearly, enormous within-country inequality is driven to a substantial extent by natural resources.  
Fourth, even ignoring the extremes, regional inequality within countries is substantial and appears to decline 
with development.  The ratio of incomes of 75
th to 25
th percentile regions is 1.68 in the poorest countries, 
but declines to 1.44 in the richest ones. The standard deviation of (log) GDP per capita is 39% in the poorest 
20 countries, but declines to 23% in the richest 20 countries.   
To understand these patterns of inequality within countries, we try to see how they evolve over 
time.   To this end, we use our model to assess the speed of convergence and its determinants.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
  We now present our basic empirical results across both regions and countries. The estimation of 
Equation (7) with OLS implicitly assumes that regional income      is uncorrelated with the error term. The 
problem is that regional productivity differences, in this case absorbed by the error term, would create a 
positive correlation between regional income and growth, giving the misleading impression of little (or no) 
convergence.  Various studies have dealt with this problem in a variety of ways, none perfect, ranging from 
including  many  controls  for  productivity  differences  to  fixed  effects  estimation.  Following  the 
recommendation of Barro (2012), our basic results do not include country fixed effects in cross-country 
regressions and region fixed effects in cross-region regressions.  As we show in the robustness section, such 
fixed  effects  estimates  lead  to  much  faster  convergence  rates,  but  probably  for  spurious  econometric 14 
 
reasons (Hurwicz 1950, Nickell 1981).   Barro (2012) also uses lagged per capita GDP as an instrument for 
current per capita GDP to address an errors-in-variables concern.   For comparability purposes, we also 
present  results  using  instrumental  variables,  which  make  little  difference  for  parameter  estimates  but 
sharply cut sample size.      
To begin, Table 3 presents the basic regional regressions, using all the data we have.  Following Barro 
(2012), we estimate panel regressions with 5-year growth rates of real per capita regional GDP as dependent 
variables.  To get at convergence, we control for beginning of period levels of per capita income.  To get at 
spillovers from national income, which are implied by our model, we also control for national per capita GDP 
at the beginning of the period.  To take into account the fact that different regions might have different 
steady states, we use the usual geographic controls, such as latitude, inverse distance to coast, malaria 
ecology, log of the cumulative oil and gas production, log of population density, and a dummy for whether 
the national capital is in the region.  In some specifications, we also control for the beginning of each 5-year 
period years of education in the region.   
  In the first three columns of Table 3, we present results with no fixed effects at all.  In the next three 
columns, we control for country fixed effects.  Because it is customary to insert in growth equations time 
controls accounting for variation of growth rates over time (again, see Barro 2012), in column (7) we also 
include year fixed effects.  Finally, we present the IV specification in column (9), and the OLS specification for 
the same (smaller) sample in column (8).      
The results on control variables in Table 3 confirm some well-known findings.  Without country fixed 
effects,  latitude,  inverse  distance  to  coast,  natural  resource  endowments,  and  population  density  all 
influence regional growth rates in expected ways.  The economic significance of these four variables on per 
capita GDP growth ranges from .5 percentage points for a one-standard deviation increase in latitude to .15 
percentage points for a one-standard deviation increase in oil.  These results are much weaker, or disappear, 
when country fixed effects are controlled for.  There is also a strong result, even with country fixed effects, 
that regions that include a national capital have grown about .8% faster during this period.  15 
 
The main result of OLS specifications in Table 3 is the confirmation of the “iron law” convergence 
rate of about 2.5% - 3% per year in this regional sample.  Without country fixed effect, we also find that 
doubling the country’s per capita income raises the region’s growth rate by about 1.7%, consistent with our 
model.  Interestingly,  the  inclusion  of  country  fixed  effects  leaves  the  convergence  coefficient  almost 
unaffected, while rendering regional controls such as geography insignificant.  This suggests that the regional 
information contained in the controls is accounted for by country fixed effects, but the latter in turn contain 
little additional information relative to the controls themselves.  Consistent with our priors, the omitted 
variable bias does not appear to be very large at the regional level once country effects are controlled for.   
Years of education also enter significantly in the regional growth regressions, with the usual sign.  
Increasing  average  education  by  5  years  (a  big  change)  raises  the  annual  growth  rate  by  between  1% 
(without country fixed effects) and 3% (with country fixed effects), depending on the specification.  This 
effect of education on regional growth is consistent with the standard findings in a cross-section of countries 
(Barro 1991, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992), but also with the cross-sectional evidence that differences in 
education  explain  by  far  the  largest  share  of  differences  in  per  capita  incomes  across  regions  within 
countries (Gennaioli et al. 2013).  
Column (8) presents the OLS results with country and year fixed effects on the smaller sample for 
which we can instrument GDP with lagged GDP.  The estimated convergence rate drops to 1.8% per year for 
this smaller sample.  Column (9) presents an IV regression similar to Barro (2012), but for regions.  The use of 
instrumental variables for regional data does not materially affect the convergence rate, now estimated at 
1.9%. Since IV has a minor impact on convergence, we emphasize the OLS estimates for a larger sample.      
The estimates of the average convergence rate hide substantial heterogeneity among countries.  
Some of the most rapidly growing countries in the sample, such as India, China, and Chile, actually exhibit 
regional divergence.    Later in the paper, we investigate national determinants of convergence rates. 
  The  results  obtained  from  the  estimation of Equation  (7)  are  quite  surprising.    Even  a  regional 
convergence rate of 3% is not much higher than the cross country convergence rate documented by Barro 
(2012).  In principle, one might think that mobility of human and physical capital should be much higher 16 
 
within than across countries, leading to much faster convergence across region than across countries. To see 
whether this finding is not an artifact of our sample, and thus to better compare regional and national 
convergence, Table 4 presents the basic cross-country results for the 89 countries in our sample that have 
per capita GDP data going back to at least the year 1965.  Columns (1)-(4) include no fixed effects, whereas 
in column (5) we include year fixed effects.  Column (6) shows the results where income is instrumented 
with past income.  We take data from the standard period over which these results are usually considered, 
1960-2010.  We use 5-year economic growth rates as independent variables.  We use beginning-of-the-
period national income to get at convergence.   We use the same geographic controls as in Table 3 and, 
consistent  with  the  earlier  literature,  find  several  statistically  significant  effects,  especially  for  inverse 
distance to coast.  In the context of national growth, we cannot identify the spillover effect predicted by 
Equation (7), and so we exclude world income in specifications with year fixed effects.    
  In  specifications  including  only  geographic  controls,  the  estimated  convergence  rate  between 
countries is only .3% to .4%.  However, as we add additional controls, especially life expectancy, investment-
to-GDP, and fertility (which of course are correlated with initial per capita income), we can raise estimated 
convergence rates to about 1.7% per year in OLS specifications.   An instrumental variable specification in 
column (6) yields a very similar 1.7%, showing that, again, IV does not matter.  These are somewhat slower 
than regional convergence rates, but comparable to Barro’s estimated “iron law” rate of 2%.   We also find 
that greater human capital is associated with faster growth when we control for geography but not when we 
add additional controls such as life expectancy, investment-to-GDP, and fertility.    
  We draw  two tentative conclusions from these specifications.  First, a comparison of  estimated 
convergence rates in Tables 3 and 4 points to higher estimates within countries than between countries, by 
about 1% per year, in OLS specifications. This result is supportive of the model because: i) resources such as 
human and physical capital are more mobile within than between countries, and ii) productivity differences 
between regions of a country are likely to be smaller than those between countries, which implies that the 
downward  bias  of  the  estimated  convergence  rate  is  likely  smaller  in  within-country  estimates.  Both 
considerations imply that convergence should be faster at the regional than at the national level.  The 17 
 
second message emerging from our estimates is that, although higher, the rate of convergence between 
regions is puzzlingly close to that estimated between countries.  In this sense, the OLS difference in these 
convergence rates of about 1% can be viewed as an upper bound on the role of regional mobility.
5  
To evaluate the role of mobility more precisely, we can use the  results of Table 3 to infer the 
structural parameters of the model, and in particular assess the mobility frictions entailed by our estimates.  
Recall that this table uses both cross-regional variation in initial incomes, and some residual  cross-country 
variation, to estimate convergence. The (negative of the) coefficient on beginning -of-period income is an 
estimate of the “convergence” rate          in Equation (7), while the coefficient on national income is an 
estimate of “aggregate externality”          in Equation (7).    In effect, we have two equations with two 
unknowns.  These estimates suggest, roughly, that α = .99 and τ = .98.  In other words, the data suggests a 
model in which broadly defined human and physical capital captures the lion’s share of national income and 
there are significant barriers to capital mobility.  The high value of α is in the ballpark of standard estimates 
for the income share remunerating physical and human capital.  The most puzzling finding is instead the high 
within-country mobility cost implied by τ = .98.  We later come back to these parameter values to discuss 
their implications for the elasticity of migration in Equation (10). For now, we just note that, even within 
countries, the approximate model in which every sub-national region converges at its own speed seems to 
be a good approximation.  In Section 5, we show that these results are robust to accounting for population 
growth and depreciation of capital.       
In light of these puzzling findings, several questions arise.  First, can we directly measure the limits to 
within- country mobility?  Second, can these limits shed light on the slow regional convergence documented 
in Table 3?  Third, is the directly measured factor mobility within countries slow and particularly so in 
countries with high measured barriers to mobility? In the remainder of our empirical analysis, we address 
these questions.  
                                                           
5 A 1% difference in convergence rates has a substantial impact on the length of time to converge.  For example, per 
capita GDP in the poorest region in the median country in our sample is 40% below the country mean.  Closing that gap 
would take 25 years at a 2% convergence rate but only 17 years at a 3% convergence rate.  18 
 
Theoretically, there are two broad sources of limited factor mobility (and thus of slow convergence 
among regions).  One is the presence of non-tradable sectors, such as housing and services.  Another is the 
presence of artificial barriers to factor mobility across regions. Because in both cases there is a departure 
from the law of one price, one could use regional differences in goods or factor prices to measure limits to 
mobility.  However, since we do not have data on regional prices, we cannot measure mobility barriers in 
this way.  Of course, price differences across regions also imply that real income differences between regions 
are smaller than what we measure without using regional price deflators.
6  
An alternative strategy to measure limits to  mobility is to try to find  direct proxies for legal and 
regulatory barriers to  factor mobility across regions.   At first sight, this seems counterintuitive,  since we 
typically think of  human and physical capital as being highly mobile within countries.   Lucas (1990) has 
famously asked why physical capital does not move across international borders.  Reasons include the lack of 
proper institutions and of complementary factors of production, such as human capital, in poor countries.  In 
the regional context, the latter  explanation itself relies on lack of mobility of human capital .  Although 
institutional  differences  are  minimal  within  countries  ( and  do  not  explain  diffe rences  in  regional 
development, Gennaioli et al. 2013), limited mobility may be the consequence of a country’s overall market 
infrastructure, such as the extent of regulation of financial, labor and goods markets.  Inappropriate country-
wide regulations can create barriers to factor mobility and can be measured directly.   
To get at this issue, we proxy for the barriers to factor mobility using the following measures of a 
country’s  market  infrastructure:  an  index  of  the  regulation  of  domestic  financial  markets  from  Abiad, 
Detragiache and Tressel (2008), an index of international trade tariffs from Spilimbergo and Che (2012), an 
index of labor regulations from Aleksynska and Schindler (2011).  We also use a dummy equal to 1 if the 
country’s laws are of English Legal Origin.  According to La Porta et al. (2008), English Legal Origin is a broad 
indicator of a market-supporting regulatory stance.  To assess whether the public sector has a direct effect 
on regional convergence, we also proxy for determinants of mobility using two measures of redistribution: a 
                                                           
6In particular, if labor and capital are perfectly mobile, their real remuneration would be equalized across regions. 
Although accounting for regional price differences is crucial to assess living standards, it is less important for our main 
goal, which is to analyze productivity differences across regions. 19 
 
measure of government transfers and subsidies as a fraction of total government spending, and the ratio of 
government spending to GDP.  Finally, we check Lucas’s hypothesis by investigating the role of regional 
human capital in affecting mobility and thus the region’s speed of convergence. 
To evaluate the role of different mobility barriers in shaping the speed of regional convergence, we 
estimate  Equation  (8)  by  interacting  the  (log)  level  of  regional  GDP  by  using  the  previously  described 
institutional variables as proxies for    in Equation (8).  Lucas’ hypothesis is tested by replacing    with a 
region specific interactive variable: the region’s human capital as proxied by its average level of schooling.  
As first step, we check how the rate of regional convergence depends on the (log) level of GDP in the country 
(formally, this is akin to setting        ).  All regressions include country fixed effects to capture time-
invariant determinants of productivity.
7   
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 5.  All regressions include our standard geography 
controls, regional per capita GDP, country fixed effects, and proxies for     entered separately.  In Panel A, 
the regressions also include the interaction between each proxy and regional GDP per capita.  In Panel B, we 
add to the previous specification the level of GDP per capita as well as the interaction between regional and 
national GDP per capita.  The regressions omit the interaction between national GDP per capita and proxies 
for   , because national and regional GDP per capita are highly correlated.
8   
Begin with Panel A.  We find that  higher (log) GDP per capita  is associated with faster regional 
convergence (see Column 1, Panel A).  To interpret the economic magnitude of the coefficients, consider a 
region with GDP per capita of $800 in a country with a GDP per capita of $1,000 (roughly the level of 
Tanzania).  Our estimates suggest that boosting national GDP per capita by 20% while keeping regional per 
capita GDP constant at $800 adds .53 percentage points to the hypothetical region’s growth rate.  Columns 2 
to 8 in Panel A introduce one at the time the interactions with proxies for national market infrastructure and 
                                                           
7 We also tried: (1) an index of the regulation of capital flows from Abiad, et al.  (2008), (2) an index of the regulation of 
the banking from Abiad, et al.  (2008), (3) an index of capital controls from Schindler (2009), and (4) the number of 
months of severance payments for a worker with 9 years of tenure on the job from Aleksynska et al. (2011). 
8Formally, the regressions in Panel A of Table 5 do not include the term                     appearing in Equation (8).  The 
reason is that national and regional incomes are strongly correlated.  As a result, having a set of interactions between 
national  income  and  country-level  determinants  of  the  speed  of  convergence  creates  multicolinearity  problems.   
Nevertheless, the results on interactions are qualitatively similar if we add national income as a control (Table 5B). 20 
 
government  transfers.    These  regressions  indicate  that  more  liberalized  financial  markets,  lower 
international trade tariff rates, and higher government transfers all increase the speed of convergence.  To 
quantify these effects, consider again a hypothetical region with GDP per capita of $800.  Our estimates then 
suggest  that  this  hypothetical  region  grows  3.02  percentage  points  faster  when  the  domestic  finance 
(de)regulation index is two standard deviations higher than the sample average, 2.66 percentage points 
faster when tariffs are two standard deviations below their sample average, and 5.76 percentage points 
faster when government transfers are two standard deviations higher than the sample average.
9  The results 
generally support the  model’s prediction that frictions slow the convergence rate.  The exception is the 
effect of common law since it implies that – despite having more favorable market infrastructure --- the 
convergence rate is 1.31 percentage points lower in common law countries than in civil law ones.   
Because the interaction term is typically negative, the economic magnitudes of these effects tend to 
decline sharply with GDP per capita (the effect of English Legal Origin is the exception).  For example, a 
region with per capita GDP of $8,000 grows .91 (vs 3.02) percentage points faster when the domestic finance 
(de)regulation index is two standard deviations higher than the sample average, .76 (vs 2.66) percentage 
points  faster  when  tariffs  are  two  standard  deviations  below  their  sample  average,  and  1.44  (vs  5.76) 
percentage points faster when government transfers are two standard deviations higher than the sample 
average.  In contrast, there is no evidence that the speed of convergence is associated with labor regulation 
or government expenditure.  Although the effect of English Legal Origin remains puzzling, these results 
suggest  that  economic  and  financial  development,  international  trade,  and  government  transfers  may, 
ceteris paribus, reduce regional inequality. 
Because the quality of market infrastructure and government redistribution may be products of 
economic development, in Panel B we include these proxies while controlling for the interaction between 
regional and national per capita GDP as well as the level of (log) per capita GDP.  Neither trade tariffs nor 
government transfers play a role here.   The coefficient of the interaction between regional GDP and both 
                                                           
9 Results are qualitatively similar for the index of capital controls (i.e. 9.13 percentage points faster growth when the 
index of capital controls is two standard deviations above its average) and the index of banking regulation (i.e. 12.67 
percentage point faster growth when the index of banking regulation is two standard deviations above its average).   21 
 
the  domestic  financial  regulation  index  and  English  Legal  Origin  are  roughly  unchanged  and  remain 
statistically  significant,  while  the  interactions  between  regional  GDP  and  both  trade  and  government 
transfers lose statistical significance.  Financial market infrastructure emerges as a robust predictor of faster 
regional convergence. 
Next, we investigate the role of regional human capital in promoting regional convergence.  We find 
no evidence that the rate of convergence (as opposed to regional growth rate per se) varies with regional 
education.  The results in the last column of Panel A show that while regional education has a large impact 
on the growth rate of GDP per capita, the interaction term between regional education and GDP per capita is 
insignificant (and remains insignificant in Panel B). 
Having documented that proxies for mobility barriers are indeed correlated with slower regional 
convergence, we now directly look at the role factor movements: is regional factor mobility particularly slow 
in countries having stronger market barriers?  To get a rough estimate of the magnitude of human capital 
mobility between regions, we use census data for 26 countries.  These data enable us to calculate the share 
of each region’s population over the age of 15 that has arrived in the previous 5 years from a different 
region.  They also enable us to calculate the share of college-educated workers who have recently arrived in 
the total number of college-educated.   
  Table 6 presents these results.   Panel 6A reports the raw data, showing that, in an average region 
in this sample, only 3.8% of the adults are recent migrants, although in Mongolia in particular, this share is 
much higher.  The average share of recent college-educated migrants is a much higher but still modest 8.1%, 
and high not only in Mongolia but also in Spain, South Africa, and France.  
Panel 6B presents the simple regressions of the determinants of in-migration into each region.  In-
migration is lower into densely populated regions, which might reflect housing costs.  Total in-migration in a 
region also increases with the region’s relative income, although not for the subset of college educated 
workers.   Critically, though, the responsiveness of total in-migration to relative per capita GDP is fairly 
muted:  in-migration adds 1.2 percentage points to the population of a region that doubles its per capita 
GDP relative to the national level.   In Panel 6C we run a finer test, considering how total in-migration is 22 
 
related to the previously used measures of a country’s market infrastructure.   In-migration is higher in 
countries having less regulated financial and goods markets, consistent with the idea that better market 
infrastructure fosters human capital mobility.  Consistent with Lucas’s hypothesis, in-migration increases 
with the level of education of the region.  These preliminary results are consistent with our finding of slow 
convergence: human capital at least does not move too fast.  Of course, we have no data on the movement 
of physical capital, which might be faster.   
In  sum,  the  results  in  this  section  indicate  –  quite  surprisingly  --  that  the  speed  of  regional 
convergence is not substantially faster than that of national convergence. In part, this seemingly puzzling 
phenomenon may be due to differences in standards of living across regions, which we cannot measure in 
our dataset.  Our analysis, however, points to a complementary possibility, namely the presence of sub-
national barriers to the mobility of human and physical capital across regions.  In particular, the data point to 
the importance of poorly developed financial markets as one of the factors slowing down mobility.   
Before interpreting these findings in light of our model, we briefly discuss their robustness with 
respect to the inclusion of regional fixed effects.  In a regional context, this is akin to introducing a region-
specific constants   ,  consistent with Equation (7).  Barro (2012) urges against the use of such estimates 
because of the strong bias toward faster estimated convergence in short panels (see Nickell 1981).   As 
previously noted, we agree with Barro, but show the results for completeness.   
  Table 7 presents the results.  The estimated regional convergence rates jump to the neighborhood of 
11% (see columns 2-4 in Table 7A) while the estimated national convergence rates now range from 3% to 
4.6% (see columns 2-4 in Table 7B).  Our regional convergence results are of the same order of magnitude as 
the  10%  annual  cross-country  convergence  rate  estimated  by  Caselli  et  al.  (1996)  for  growth  using 
instrumental variables, but in all likelihood overestimate the speed of convergence.   The coefficient on 
national income also rises sharply (see Panel A), indicating large spillovers from national income to regional 
growth.  Interestingly, even these much higher, and likely biased, parameter estimates imply relatively low 
rates of mobility of full capital.  The estimates suggested by column (2) of Panel A, for example, imply 
         and         .  At the substantive level, even with no bias for omitted productivity differences 23 
 
between regions, the data suggest relatively low factor mobility at least with respect to the frictionless 
benchmark of         – a result substantially at odds with the proposition that broad capital is freely mobile 
within countries.   
  Although the finding of low factor mobility within countries is surprising, the convergence rates 
suggested by fixed effects regressions are implausibly high, and inconsistent with the evidence of persistent 
regional inequality.   At 11% annual convergence rates, the regional disparities that we observe in the data 
would quickly become small (assuming of course, that productivity differences across regions are modest).  
In the next section, we summarize the implications of our findings for the parameters of the model and 
patterns of regional inequality.  
 
5. Taking Stock 
Our estimation results – summarized by the estimates in Table 3 – imply values for the structural 
parameters   and   that point to significant limits to regional mobility.  While the value of   is reasonable, 
placed in a narrow range between 0.95 (in columns 6 and 7) and 0.99 (columns 2 and 3), the values of   are 
puzzlingly large, located in a narrow range between 0.98 (in columns 2 and 3) and 1.02 (columns 6 and 7).  
We now investigate the implication of these findings for: i) the elasticity of migration to return differentials, 
ii) the country-level variation in mobility frictions, and thus iii) country-level variation in regional inequality. 
Equation (10) provides a direct way to map   and   into an estimate for the elasticity of migration to 
return  differentials.  The  latter  is  in  fact  given  (1-τ)/(1-α).    Given  the  value  of    =  0.99,  if           the 
elasticity  of  capital  migration  (or,  equivalently,  employment)  equals  2.    Because  in  our  regressions  we 
measure growth over five year intervals, the value 2 should be interpreted as the elasticity of migration over 
a  five-year  period  of  persistent  return  differentials.    Across  countries,  Ortega  and  Peri  (2009)  find  an 
elasticity of migration of roughly 0.3 to one-year changes in destination country income, while Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1991) surprisingly find a number close to zero within the United States.  Braun (1993) extends 
Barro/Sala-i-Martin results to a sample regions within 6 wealthy countries, and finds an even lower elasticity 
of migration than in the US in five of them, and comparable in one (Japan).  Our results on migration in Table 24 
 
6 are indicative of a low elasticity.  If barriers to mobility are higher across than within countries, 0.3 should 
be viewed as a lower bound  on the one-year elasticity  for regional mobility of workers. Perhaps more 
fundamentally, because our notion of capital includes both human and physical capital, we should expect 
the empirical counterpart of Equation (10) to be quite high, reflecting the relatively high mobility of physical 
capital.  The elasticity of factor mobility implies by Equation (10) is very sensitive to the value of     If   drops 
from 0.98 to 0.95 elasticity more than doubles from 2 to 5.  Given the scant evidence on the elasticity of 
migration of different forms of capital, these numbers should be viewed as very preliminary.   
On the other hand, our estimates allow us to examine the country-level determinants of mobility 
frictions  .  As we just discussed,   affects the elasticity of factor mobility and thus the speed of convergence.  
With all the usual caveats attached to cross-country regressions, in Table 5 finance emerges as a key factor 
that explains differences in factor mobility costs.  The estimate of the role of finance in Panel A is again 
consistent  with  the  value   =0.99  but  it  further  implies  that   ,  the  parameter  shaping  the  gradient  of 
mobility costs with respect to our financial market indicator, is roughly equal to 0.02 (indeed, parameter 
estimates for the finance-income interaction imply           ). This implies that the elasticity of capital 
mobility to return differentials should be equal to 0 in a country with fully repressed financial markets 
(      ) and to 2 in a country financial markets are fully liberalized (      ).   
What do these values imply for the impact of financial frictions on the speed of regional convergence 
and on the steady state level of regional inequality?  Our estimates indicate that fully liberalizing financial 
markets increases the convergence rate by 1.6 percentage points.  This suggests that financial development 
can play an important role in the process of regional convergence.  At the same time, it indicates that 
financial development alone cannot break the shackles of the iron law: the maximum convergence rate 
equals 2.8% (=0.0127+0.0157), and has a modest impact on the number of years that it takes for the per 
capita GDP of a poor region to catch up to the national average.  In sum, the mobility attained with fully 
liberalized financial markets is still far from ensuring fast regional convergence. 
Can finance account for cross country patterns of regional income disparities?  For   = 0.99 and   = 
0.02, Equation (9) implies the variance of log regional GDP in a country with repressed financial markets (  = 25 
 
0) is 2.95 times larger than in a country with fully liberalized financial markets (  = 1).  Unlike in the case of 
the speed of convergence, variation in financial liberalization exerts a large impact on the dispersion of 
regional GDP.  In our data, the average variance of log GDP per capita is 19% among the 20 poorest countries 
and 8% among the 20 richest ones.  The average    for the poorest 20 countries in our sample is .34; that for 
the richest 20 is .70, implying the dispersion of regional GDP pc in the former 1.4 times larger than that in 
the latter.  The model can thus explain roughly 60% of the 2.4 fold difference in measures of regional income 
dispersion. 
Finally,  we  examine  how  the  mapping  between  the  structural  parameters  and  the  estimated 
coefficients changes when we relax the assumptions that capital depreciates fully in one period (δ=1) and 
that population growth is zero (n=0).    As we  show in Appendix 2, in the more general case with the 
population growth rate   and depreciation rate  , the speed of convergence equals                    and 
the coefficient on national per capita GDP is                      .  In this case, backing out   and   from 
estimated coefficients requires making an explicit assumption on      .  Note that our main estimating 
equation (7) holds exactly when δ+n equals 1.   In the more general case, the convergence coefficients are 
based on a log-linear approximation around the steady state.   We assume that the annual growth rate of 
population is 2% (i.e., roughly equal to the average growth rate of the world population during the period 
1960-2010) and that the annual depreciation rate is 6% in line with the depreciation of physical capital (e.g. 
see  Caselli  2005).    Next,  we  combine  the  assumption  that  δ+n  equals  40%  over  a  five-year  period 
(=5x(2%+6%)) with the coefficients from estimating the empirical analogue of our preferred specification (i.e. 
column 3 of Table 3) for 5-year growth rates of regional GDP per capita.  The results suggest that   = 0.89 
and   = 0.95.
10   These estimates for   imply that relaxing the assumption that       = 1 does not lead to 
regional convergence rates that are meaningfully faster than at the national level (i.e. regional convergence 
rates for τ equal to 0.8 are still about one percent faster than under the benchmark suggested by      ).  
Accordingly, our  finding  of  substantial  limits  to  within  country  factor  mobility  is  robust  to  allowing  for 
conventional value of population growth and the depreciation rate of the capital stock.      
                                                           
10 Alternatively, setting δ+n equal to 8% per year, the estimated coefficients from our basic specification for the annual 
growth rate of regional per capita GDP as the dependent variable implies that α equals 0.98 and τ is 0.78. 26 
 
6. Conclusion 
  Our analysis of growth and convergence in 1,503 regions of 82 countries allows for some tentative 
conclusions.  First, regional growth is shaped by some of the same key factors as national growth, namely 
geography and human capital.  Second, our estimated annual rate of regional convergence of 2.5% per year 
is similar to Barro’s “iron law” of 2%.   These regional convergence estimates are about 1% per year higher 
than what we estimate for countries, but still raise a key puzzle of why the flow of capital between regions of 
a country is so slow.  Third, regional growth and convergence are faster in richer countries, consistent with 
the prediction of our neoclassical model that the national supply of capital benefits regional investment and 
growth.  Fourth, among the national factors correlated with the speed of regional convergence is capital 
market  regulation:  countries  with  better  regulation  exhibit  faster  convergence.    This  finding  is  again 
consistent with the notion that frictions within countries limit capital flows and convergence.   The facts on 
persistent regional inequality and slow convergence thus line up with each other, but they do leave open the 
puzzle of why resource flows within countries are typically so slow.         
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Appendix 1.   
Proof of Proposition 1.   
At time t+1, the employment of capital in region   is equal to                 (  ̂     )
 
(  ̂        )
   
. 
By replacing in this expression the capital endowment   ̂                       
    and the aggregate capital 
shock         ∫      
    , we obtain that the growth of employed capital in region   is equal to:   
      
    
             
              (  ̂        ∫      
    )
   
  
which is Equation (5) in the text. 
A steady state in the economy is a configuration of regional employment    
    and an entailed 
aggregate capital employment       ∫     
      such that the steady state capital   
  in any region   is: 
            
                (  ̂        ∫     
     )
   
  
where    is the normalization factor in the steady state.   This can be rewritten as: 
   
           
                        (
∫     
     
∫  
     
)
   
                                              
There is always an equilibrium in which   
      for all regions  .  Once we rule out this possibility, the 
equilibrium is interior and unique.   In fact, Equation (A.1) can be written as   
      
            
        , where   is 
a positive constant which takes the same value for all regions, where such value depends on the entire 
profile of regional capital employment levels.  Because the capital employed in a region does not affect (has 
a negligible impact on) the aggregate constant  , there is a unique value of   
  fulfilling the condition.  By 
plugging the value of   
  into the expressions for    and ∫     
     ,  one can find that for       and      , 
there is a unique value of   that is consistent with equilibrium.    
Finally, given the fact that               (           )
 
, the economy approaches the interior steady 
state according to Equation (5) in the text. 
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Appendix 2.  Convergence coefficients for generic values of depreciation and population growth.    
Our main analysis assumes a zero rate of population growth (     ) and full depreciation (     ).  
Focusing on this case allowed us to obtain an exact closed form for our main estimating equation.  We now 
perform a log-linear approximation to derive convergence coefficients when   and   are generic. 
In region  , the growth of per capita GDP between periods   and       is equal to                 
which, by the assumed production function, is equal to    (
      
    
)    (
      
    
   )  There is a direct link 
between a region’s income growth and the growth of the region’s per capita capital employment.  
Let us therefore find the law of motion for      for generic values of   and  . Denote by   ̂    the 
capital endowment of region   at time  , and by      the same region’s employment of capital.   The law of 
motion for   ̂    then fulfills:  
  ̂               
      
                  ̂     
The  capital  stock  next  period  is  equal  to  undepreciated  capital              ̂     plus  this  period’s  savings 
       
      
   .  To express the equation in per capita terms, we can devide both sides of the above equation 
by the region’s population      at time   and obtain: 
  ̂     
    
 
  ̂     
      
 
      
    
    ̂               
      
                ̂     
The law of motion of the region’s per capita capital endowment can be approximated as: 
  ̂               
                 ̂                                                             
To solve for regional GDP growth, we need to transform the above equation into a law of motion for regional 
capital employment     .  To do so, we can exploit our migration equation (4) to write: 
  ̂      (    )
 
    (  ̂      )
    
        
  
    
By plugging the above equation into       we then obtain, after some algebra, the following equation: 
      
    
      *       
    
        
 
    (  ̂      )
   
               +
 
  [
    
  
]
   
  [
  
    
]        32 
 
 By noting that the aggregate capital stock grows at the rate                                   , we can 
rewrite the above law of motion as: 
 
      
    
      *       
    
        
 
    (  ̂      )
   
               +
 
  [                      ]      [
  
    
]      
A steady state is identified by the condition                       and thus                . Because in the 
steady state there is no migration, and the human capital endowment of a region is also equal to its ideal 
employment  level,  we  also  have that               .    As  a  result,  the  steady state  is  identified  by the 
following conditions:  
        
    
    (  ̂       )
   
             
              (∫       
      )            
  
If we log-linearize with respect to regional employment      and national output    the right hand side of the 
law of motion of      around the steady state above, we find that for any       we can write the following 
approximation: 
      
    
                              (
    
     
)                         (
  
   
)  
By exploiting the fact that   (
      
    
)   (
      
    
   )       (
      
    
   ), we can then write: 
             
    
                          (
    
     
)                             (
  
   
)  
As a result, the speed of convergence is equal to                    and regional growth increases in country 
level income with coefficient                       .  These coefficient boil down to those obtained under the 
exact formulas of our model when             (and thus when, as assumed in the model,       and      ).  
When, on the other hand,             , the mapping between our estimates and the economy’s “deep” 
parameters will be different, entailing different values for   and  .   
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Figure I: Sample Coverage 
 
 Data on Years of Schooling
Albania 1990,2001,2009 1989, 2001 
Argentina 1953,1970,1980,1993-2005 1970, 1980, 1991, 2001, 2010 
Australia 1953,1976,1989-2008 1966, 2006 
Austria 1961-1992,1995-2008,2010 1964, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2009
Bangladesh 1982,1993,1995,1999,2005 1981, 2001 
Belgium 1960-1968,1995-2010 1961, 2001 
Benin 1992,1998,2004 1992, 2002 
Bolivia 1980-1986,1988-2010 1976, 1992, 2001 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1963,2010 1961, 1991 
Brazil 1950-1966,1970,1975,1980,1985-2009 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, 2000, 2010 
Bulgaria 1990,1995-2010 1965, 1992, 2011
Canada 1956,1961-2011 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2006 
Chile 1960-2001,2008-2010 1960, 1970, 1982, 1992, 2002 
China 1952-1978,1982,1985,2006-2010 1982, 1990, 2000, 2010 
Colombia 1950,1960-2010  1964, 1973, 1985, 1993, 2005 
Croatia 1963,2000-2009 1961, 2001 
Czech Republic 1993,1995-2010 1993, 2011 
Denmark 1970-1991,1993-2010 1970, 2006
Ecuador 1993,1996,1999,2001-2007 1962, 1974, 1982, 1990, 2001, 2010 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1992,1998,2007 1986, 1996, 2006 
El Salvador 1996,1999,2002,2010 1992, 2007 
Estonia 1996-2009 1997, 2009
Finland 1960,1970,1983-1992,1995-2010 1960, 1980, 1985, 2010
France 1950,1960,1962-1969,1977-2010 1962, 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006 
Germany, East 1991-2010 1970, 1971, 1981, 1987, 2009 
Germany, West 1950,1960,1970-2010 1970, 1971, 1981, 1987, 2009
Greece 1970,1974,1977-2008,2010 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 
Guatemala 1995,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008 1994, 2002 
Honduras 1988-2003 1988, 2001 
Hungary 1975,1994-2002,2007-2010 1970, 2005
India 1980-1993,1999-2010 1971, 2001 
Indonesia 1971,1983,1996,2004-2010 1971, 1976, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
Ireland 1960,1979,1991-2010 1966, 1971, 1979, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2002, 2006 
Italy 1950,1977,1978-1996,2001,2007,2010 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 
Japan 1955-1965,1975-2003,2006-2009 1960, 2000, 2010 
Jordan 1997,2002,2010 1994, 2004 
Kazakhstan 1990-2010 1989, 2009 
Kenya 1962,2005 1962, 1989, 1999, 2009 
Korea, Rep. 1985-2010 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
Kyrgyz Republic 1996-2000,2002-2007 1989, 1999, 2009 
Latvia 1995-2006 1989, 2001 
Lesotho 1986,1996,2000 1976, 2006 
Lithuania 1995-2010 1989, 2001 
Macedonia 1963,1990,2000-2009 1989, 2001 
Malaysia 1970,1975,1980,1990,1995,2000,2005-2010 1970, 1980, 1991, 2000 
Mexico 1950,1960,1970,1975,1980,1993-2010 1950, 1960, 1970, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
Mongolia 1989,1990-2004,2006-2007,2010 1989, 2000 
Morocco 1990,  2000-2010 2004
Mozambique 2000-2009 1997, 2007 
Nepal 1999,2006 2001 
Netherlands 1960,1965,1995-2010 2001 
Nicaragua 1974,2000,2005 2001 
Nigeria 1992,2008 1991, 2006 
Norway 1973,1976,1980,1995,1997-2005,2009-2010 1960, 2010 
Pakistan 1970-2004 1973, 1981, 1998 
Panama 1996-2007 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 
Paraguay 1992,2002,2008 1992, 2002 
Peru 1970-1995,2001-2010 1961, 1993, 2007 
Philippines 1975,1980,1986-1987,1992,1997,2006-2009 1970, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2007 
Poland 1990,1995-2010 1970, 2002 
Portugal 1977-2008,2010 1960, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011 
Romania 1995-2008 1977, 1992, 2002 
Russian Federation 1995-2009 1994, 2010 
Serbia 1963,2002 1961, 2002 
Slovak Republic 1995-2010 1991, 2001, 2011 
Slovenia 1963,1995-2010 1961, 2002, 2011 
South Africa 1970,1975,1980-1989,1995-2010 1970, 1996, 2001, 2007 
Spain 1981-2008,2010 1981, 1991, 2001 
Sri Lanka 1990,1991,1993,1995,1997,1999,2001,2003,2005,2009-2010 1981, 2001 
Sweden 1985-2008,2010 1985, 2010
Switzerland 1965,1970,1975,1978,1980-1995,1998-2005 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 
Tanzania 1980,1985,1990,1994,2000-2010 1978, 1988, 2002 
Thailand 1981-2009 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 
Turkey 1975-2001 1965, 1985, 1990, 2000 
Ukraine 1990,2004-2010 1989, 2001 
United Arab Emirates 1981-1982,1988-1991,2001-2009 1980, 2005 
United Kingdom 1950,1960,1970,2010 1951, 1991, 2001 
United States 1950-2010 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005
Uruguay 1961,1991-2002 1963, 1975, 1985, 1996, 2006 
Uzbekistan 1995-2005 1989 
Venezuela 1950,1961,1971,1981,1990 1971, 1981, 1990, 2001 
Vietnam 1990,1995,2000,2006,2008 1989, 1999, 2009 
Table 1:  Sample Coverage for GDP and Years of schooling
Country Sample Period Sample Period
Data on GDP
Page 1Country Year Minimum 25
th pctl Mean 75
th pctl Maximum 75
th pctl / 
25
th pctl
Max/Min
Ctry GDP / 
World
Mozambique 2009 $423 $475 $768 $860 $2,033 1.8 4.8 0.06
Nepal 2006 $647 $754 $917 $993 $1,258 1.3 1.9 0.08
Bangladesh 2005 $760 $819 $995 $1,037 $1,830 1.3 2.4 0.10
Tanzania 2010 $727 $780 $1,125 $1,311 $2,615 1.7 3.6 0.10
Lesotho 2000 $675 $766 $923 $1,178 $1,228 1.5 1.8 0.10
Kenya 2005 $669 $703 $1,765 $1,798 $4,472 2.6 6.7 0.11
Benin 2004 $600 $798 $1,171 $1,529 $1,542 1.9 2.6 0.12
Kyrgyz Republic 2007 $967 $1,123 $2,154 $2,533 $4,870 2.3 5.0 0.15
Nigeria 2008 $1,149 $1,461 $1,929 $2,398 $2,736 1.6 2.4 0.15
Uzbekistan 2005 $1,178 $1,398 $1,917 $2,321 $3,203 1.7 2.7 0.17
Pakistan 2004 $1,585 $1,606 $1,836 $2,067 $2,261 1.3 1.4 0.17
Vietnam 2008 $1,249 $1,588 $2,120 $2,619 $4,504 1.6 3.6 0.20
India 2010 $1,453 $2,853 $4,713 $5,611 $12,831 2.0 8.8 0.24
Nicaragua 2005 $1,410 $1,700 $1,908 $1,888 $3,023 1.1 2.1 0.25
Philippines 2009 $1,484 $1,552 $3,101 $2,936 $9,631 1.9 6.5 0.27
Honduras 2003 $1,733 $1,991 $2,733 $3,340 $3,984 1.7 2.3 0.27
Mongolia 2010 $867 $1,177 $2,154 $2,309 $8,044 2.0 9.3 0.28
Indonesia 2010 $934 $2,447 $4,103 $3,704 $16,115 1.5 17.2 0.30
Morocco 2010 $2,399 $2,834 $3,357 $3,889 $4,871 1.4 2.0 0.33
Paraguay 2008 $2,361 $2,982 $3,748 $4,307 $7,443 1.4 3.2 0.34
Guatemala 2008 $1,756 $2,510 $4,591 $6,049 $14,331 2.4 8.2 0.34
Bolivia 2010 $2,863 $3,153 $4,097 $4,619 $7,716 1.5 2.7 0.34
Sri Lanka 2010 $2,411 $2,847 $3,434 $3,378 $6,451 1.2 2.7 0.36
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2007 $3,463 $4,118 $4,381 $4,606 $5,417 1.1 1.6 0.39
Jordan 2010 $3,178 $3,723 $4,133 $4,425 $5,717 1.2 1.8 0.41
El Salvador 2010 $3,890 $4,465 $5,229 $5,754 $8,401 1.3 2.2 0.47
Ukraine 2010 $2,646 $3,520 $5,084 $6,048 $17,454 1.7 6.6 0.47
Ecuador 2007 $3,095 $3,892 $5,585 $5,738 $20,777 1.5 6.7 0.53
China 2010 $3,127 $5,249 $8,012 $9,974 $17,622 1.9 5.6 0.53
Thailand 2009 $1,982 $2,817 $7,215 $6,269 $52,001 2.2 26.2 0.58
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 $3,760 $4,571 $5,829 $6,184 $12,575 1.4 3.3 0.58
Albania 2009 $4,932 $5,578 $6,338 $6,617 $10,846 1.2 2.2 0.60
Serbia 2002 $1,612 $4,517 $5,466 $6,318 $9,439 1.4 5.9 0.66
Colombia 2010 $3,125 $4,147 $6,311 $7,019 $14,876 1.7 4.8 0.66
Peru 2010 $2,382 $3,511 $6,008 $6,965 $16,401 2.0 6.9 0.67
Macedonia 2009 $3,542 $4,618 $6,713 $7,798 $11,762 1.7 3.3 0.73
South Africa 2010 $5,836 $6,279 $7,048 $7,817 $8,659 1.2 1.5 0.74
Brazil 2009 $2,909 $3,848 $6,426 $8,978 $12,113 2.3 4.2 0.76
Uruguay 2002 $3,640 $5,142 $6,156 $6,917 $10,745 1.3 3.0 0.78
Turkey 2001 $1,989 $4,598 $6,215 $7,467 $14,759 1.6 7.4 0.85
Kazakhstan 2010 $3,489 $7,237 $12,986 $13,681 $43,931 1.9 12.6 0.85
Bulgaria 2010 $5,600 $6,403 $8,028 $8,355 $23,397 1.3 4.2 0.90
Panama 2008 $2,737 $3,857 $6,797 $5,335 $17,713 1.4 6.5 0.90
Argentina 2005 $3,704 $4,651 $10,179 $12,652 $28,358 2.7 7.7 0.91
Romania 2008 $4,911 $6,684 $8,772 $10,260 $26,242 1.5 5.3 0.91
Mexico 2010 $5,130 $8,033 $13,442 $12,823 $84,158 1.6 16.4 0.98
Venezuela 1990 $466 $3,790 $7,677 $10,741 $21,422 2.8 46.0 1.05
Malaysia 2010 $4,098 $7,451 $11,086 $13,515 $20,500 1.8 5.0 1.07
Russian Federation 2009 $2,528 $7,770 $12,995 $13,017 $64,254 1.7 25.4 1.09
Chile 2010 $4,878 $8,324 $13,189 $14,874 $42,174 1.8 8.6 1.14
Latvia 2006 $3,048 $5,550 $8,030 $9,082 $21,320 1.6 7.0 1.18
Lithuania 2010 $6,243 $9,098 $11,555 $13,473 $21,935 1.5 3.5 1.22
Croatia 2009 $8,207 $10,597 $12,694 $12,933 $26,079 1.2 3.2 1.29
Estonia 2009 $7,272 $8,264 $10,744 $11,120 $25,738 1.3 3.5 1.30
Hungary 2010 $7,552 $10,737 $13,548 $14,964 $35,690 1.4 4.7 1.33
Poland 2010 $11,220 $12,370 $15,196 $17,380 $26,612 1.4 2.4 1.36
Slovak Republic 2010 $10,558 $15,024 $20,018 $20,665 $45,815 1.4 4.3 1.57
Portugal 2010 $15,903 $17,040 $19,974 $20,423 $27,260 1.2 1.7 1.69
Czech Republic 2010 $16,586 $18,431 $21,581 $21,383 $49,908 1.2 3.0 1.85
Greece 2010 $17,072 $18,537 $21,459 $22,887 $32,612 1.2 1.9 1.88
Slovenia 2010 $16,155 $18,857 $21,866 $23,494 $35,628 1.2 2.2 1.96
Korea, Rep. 2010 $16,738 $21,924 $25,703 $30,724 $34,461 1.4 2.1 2.09
Spain 2010 $12,173 $21,554 $25,677 $29,765 $39,849 1.4 3.3 2.10
Italy 2010 $18,167 $21,283 $27,252 $32,654 $36,672 1.5 2.0 2.12
France 2010 $24,439 $25,312 $27,901 $28,074 $48,123 1.1 2.0 2.31
Japan 2009 $19,510 $25,290 $27,581 $29,208 $52,074 1.2 2.7 2.38
Finland 2010 $24,781 $28,561 $32,086 $37,851 $39,964 1.3 1.6 2.45
Denmark 2010 $19,873 $23,268 $36,691 $53,383 $61,723 2.3 3.1 2.53
United Kingdom 2010 $25,515 $27,239 $31,067 $32,761 $46,666 1.2 1.8 2.57
Belgium 2010 $23,055 $24,405 $31,586 $33,740 $49,930 1.4 2.2 2.57
Germany, West 2008 $26,532 $28,755 $34,692 $38,602 $52,740 1.3 2.0 2.63
Germany, East 2010 $26,631 $27,256 $27,290 $27,304 $27,983 1.0 1.1 2.63
Sweden 2010 $28,711 $30,328 $32,718 $33,526 $48,285 1.1 1.7 2.67
Australia 2010 $32,602 $37,430 $43,708 $53,063 $56,915 1.4 1.7 2.68
Canada 2011 $27,987 $29,726 $37,224 $39,928 $55,356 1.3 2.0 2.70
Austria 2010 $25,457 $33,379 $37,438 $40,304 $50,553 1.2 2.0 2.76
Ireland 2010 $22,393 $23,793 $30,186 $43,553 $44,459 1.8 2.0 2.82
Netherlands 2010 $29,929 $31,916 $36,799 $41,398 $47,625 1.3 1.6 2.89
Switzerland 2005 $26,290 $30,636 $37,728 $40,397 $78,885 1.3 3.0 3.10
United States 2010 $32,190 $35,999 $41,080 $44,123 $73,257 1.2 2.3 3.29
United Arab Emirates 2009 $13,253 $17,188 $37,176 $53,496 $112,294 3.1 8.5 3.63
Norway 2010 $37,442 $40,568 $45,860 $47,061 $89,007 1.2 2.4 3.67
Table 2:  Dispersion of Regional GDP per capita(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ln(GDP pc Region) -0.0104
a -0.0244
a -0.0262
a -0.0207
a -0.0254
a -0.0305
a -0.0299
a -0.0181
a -0.0199
a
(0.0022) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0048) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0046) (0.0062)
Ln(GDP pc Country) 0.0169
a 0.0163
a 0.0097 -0.0072 -0.0180 0.0044 0.0062
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0103) (0.0117) (0.0168) (0.0047) (0.0052)
Latitude 0.0004
a 0.0003
a 0.0002
c 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004
b 0.0004
b
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Inverse Distance to Coast 0.0361
c 0.0412
b 0.0537
a 0.0116 0.0192 0.0272
c 0.0259
b 0.0363 0.0374
(0.0189) (0.0194) (0.0168) (0.0136) (0.0168) (0.0140) (0.0125) (0.0218) (0.0225)
Malaria Ecology 0.0003 0.0006 0.0007 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014 0.0014 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Ln(Cum Oil & Gas Prod) 0.1879
c 0.2370
b 0.1862
c 0.1117 0.1145 0.0571 0.0488 0.0153 0.0250
(0.1000) (0.1158) (0.1019) (0.0879) (0.0967) (0.0909) (0.0916) (0.0691) (0.0777)
Ln(Population density) 0.0019
b 0.0020
b 0.0010 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0015
c 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Capital is in Region 0.0008 0.0087
b 0.0090
b 0.0122
a 0.0150
a 0.0124
a 0.0120
a 0.0046 0.0054
(0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0042)
Years of Education 0.0018
b 0.0064
a 0.0067
a 0.0025
b 0.0026
b
(0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Constant 0.0959
a 0.0673
a 0.0833
a 0.1954
a 0.1459
b 0.3119
a 0.3496
a 0.1116
a 0.1113
a
(0.0157) (0.0127) (0.0197) (0.0392) (0.0665) (0.0864) (0.1066) (0.0294) (0.0291)
Observations 7,772 7,772 6,651 7,772 7,772 6,651 6,651 4,136 4,136
Adjusted R
2
6% 8% 9% 7% 8% 10% 17% 9% 9%
Number of countries 82 82 82 82 82 80 80
Within R
2
7% 8% 10% 17%
Between R
2
7% 8% 6% 7%
Fixed Effects None None None Country Country Country Ctry, Year None None
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Instrument NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Lagged GDP
Table 3:  Determinants of Regional Growth(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(GDP pc Ctry) -0.0043
a -0.0029
c -0.0050
b -0.0177
a -0.0165
a -0.0169
a -0.0173
a -0.0160
a
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0022)
Ln(GDP pc World) -0.0160
a -0.0233
a -0.0400
a -0.0381
a 0.0000
(0.0052) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0000)
Latitude 0.0003
a 0.0002
a 0.0002
b -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Inverse Distance to Coast 0.1389
a 0.1281
a 0.1222
a 0.0251 0.0279 0.0280 0.0285 0.0387
(0.0320) (0.0315) (0.0340) (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0235) (0.0551) (0.0545)
Ln(Cum Oil & Gas Prod) -0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0017 0.0019 0.0014 0.0017 0.0029 0.0030
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0035)
Malaria Environment -0.0009
a -0.0008
a -0.0007
a -0.0006
b -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0016
b -0.0013
c
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Years Education 0.0016
b -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
1/(life expectancy at birth) -1.9446
a -2.2905
a -2.3255
a -0.6167 -1.1106
(0.6455) (0.6296) (0.6319) (0.9993) (0.9462)
Fertility -0.0264
a -0.0258
a -0.0261
a -0.0306
a -0.0304
a
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0064) (0.0062)
Law and Order 0.0137
c 0.0126 0.0127
c 0.0107 0.0080
(0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0075)
Investment-to-GDP ratio 0.0723
a 0.0730
a 0.0732
a 0.0556
a 0.0563
a
(0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0169) (0.0173)
Government-consumption-to-GDP ratio -0.0577
b -0.0445
c -0.0451
c -0.0659 -0.0551
(0.0276) (0.0267) (0.0268) (0.0434) (0.0422)
Openess 0.0061
b 0.0050
c 0.0051
c 0.0093
b 0.0080
b
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0037)
(Change in terms of trade) x Openess 0.0231 0.0187 0.0191 -0.0020 -0.0074
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0229) (0.0218)
Democracy 0.0124
b 0.0085
c 0.0088
c 0.0280 0.0155
(0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0305) (0.0283)
Democracy Squared -0.0010
a -0.0007
b -0.0007
b -0.0265 -0.0191
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0268) (0.0254)
Inflation -0.0042
a -0.0037
a -0.0037
a -0.0020 -0.0013
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0016)
Constant 0.0485
a 0.1731
a 0.2439
a 0.5476
a 0.2268
a 0.2306
a 0.5148
a 0.2158
a
(0.0122) (0.0404) (0.0524) (0.0664) (0.0216) (0.0219) (0.0822) (0.0298)
Observations 868 868 868 868 868 868 536 536
Adjusted R
2
7% 8% 9% 27% 27% 31% 22% 28%
Number of countries 89 89 89 89 89 89 54 54
Fixed Effects No No No No Year Year Year Year
Instrumental Variables None None None None None Lagged GDP None None
Table 4:  Determinants of National GDP Growth
(Countries that have initial GDP data no later than 1965)Ln(GDP pc)
English Legal 
Origin
Financial 
Regulation
Trade Labor Transf / Gov  Gov / GDP
Yrs Educ 
(Regional)
Ln(GDP pc Region) 0.0413
b -0.0237
a -0.0127
a -0.0127 -0.0068 -0.0027 -0.0138 -0.0256
a
(0.0207) (0.0056) (0.0038) (0.0091) (0.0121) (0.0163) (0.0090) (0.0082)
Interaction Var 0.0818
a 0.1574
a 0.1583
b 0.1379 0.4302
b 0.1343 0.0154
b
(0.0296) (0.0340) (0.0625) (0.1806) (0.2119) (0.1922) (0.0066)
Ln(GDP pc Region) x Interaction Var -0.0078
a 0.0131
b -0.0157
a -0.0159
b -0.0196 -0.0439
b -0.0197 -0.0011
(0.0026) (0.0065) (0.0034) (0.0074) (0.0209) (0.0216) (0.0202) (0.0007)
Latitude 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Inverse Distance to Coast 0.0164 0.0073 0.0158 0.0182 0.0209 0.0082 0.0146 0.0281
b
(0.0165) (0.0122) (0.0152) (0.0175) (0.0125) (0.0261) (0.0149) (0.0138)
Malaria Ecology 0.0011 0.0007 0.0011 0.0012 0.0013 -0.0010 0.0011 0.0015
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Ln(Cum Oil & Gas Prod) 0.1340 0.0961 0.1054 0.1320 0.1662 0.0545 0.1197 0.0803
(0.1039) (0.0954) (0.1009) (0.0831) (0.2042) (0.1380) (0.0842) (0.1036)
Ln(Population density) 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0013
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0010)
Capital is in Region 0.0160
a 0.0122
a 0.0146
a 0.0144
a 0.0160
a 0.0251
a 0.0138
a 0.0147
a
(0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Constant -0.4644
b 0.1932
a 0.1219
a 0.1174 0.0952 0.0246 0.1524
c 0.2085
a
(0.2227) (0.0361) (0.0308) (0.0716) (0.1023) (0.1489) (0.0790) (0.0657)
Observations 7,772 7,772 5,492 6,180 2,697 2,158 7,040 6,651
Adjusted R
2
18% 16% 17% 17% 19% 26% 16% 20%
Fixed Effect Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Table 5:  Country-level determinants of the speed of convergence
Panel A:  Basic SpecificationLn(GDP Country)  
English Legal 
Origin
Financial 
Regulation
Trade Labor Transf / Gov  Gov / GDP
Yrs Educ 
(Regional)
Ln(GDP pc Region) 0.0413
b 0.0397
c 0.0037 -0.0024 -0.0288 0.0836
c 0.0606
a 0.0687
c
(0.0207) (0.0201) (0.0273) (0.0208) (0.0429) (0.0496) (0.0227) (0.0357)
Ln(GDP pc Country) 0.0818
a 0.0841
a -0.0173 0.0035 -0.0442 0.0712 0.1032
a 0.1037
b
(0.0296) (0.0300) (0.0293) (0.0360) (0.0541) (0.0604) (0.0374) (0.0521)
ln(GDP pc Region) x Ln(GDP pc Country) -0.0078
a -0.0080
a -0.0017 -0.0013 0.0028 -0.0106
c -0.0101
a -0.0128
b
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0033) (0.0053)
Interaction Var 0.1375
a 0.1184 0.1713 0.2834 -0.0889 -0.0094
(0.0388) (0.1051) (0.1609) (0.2213) (0.1552) (0.0116)
Ln(GDP pc Region) x Interaction Var 0.0146
b -0.0109
b -0.0106 -0.0218 -0.0273 0.0063 0.0020
(0.0058) (0.0045) (0.0123) (0.0195) (0.0228) (0.0170) (0.0014)
Latitude 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Inverse Distance to Coast 0.0164 0.0117 0.0087 0.0148 0.0206 0.0080 0.0185 0.0238
c
(0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0143) (0.0177) (0.0130) (0.0265) (0.0168) (0.0129)
Malaria Ecology 0.0011 0.0007 0.0009 0.0011 0.0013 -0.0011 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Ln(Cum Oil & Gas Prod) 0.1340 0.1172 0.0923 0.1277 0.1584 0.0693 0.1449 0.0426
(0.1039) (0.1147) (0.0925) (0.0807) (0.2033) (0.1404) (0.0987) (0.0877)
Ln(Population density) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0016
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Capital is in Region 0.0160
a 0.0162
a 0.0124
a 0.0130
a 0.0151
b 0.0253
a 0.0171
a 0.0112
b
(0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0058) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0044)
Constant -0.4644
b -0.4853
b 0.2601 0.0987 0.4545 -0.5231 -0.6256
b -0.5432
(0.2227) (0.2302) (0.2446) (0.2268) (0.4920) (0.5103) (0.2677) (0.3634)
Observations 7,772 7,772 5,492 6,180 2,697 2,158 7,040 6,651
Adjusted R
2
18% 18% 18% 17% 19% 28% 19% 22%
Fxd Effect Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Table 5:  Determinants of the speed of convergence (continued)
Panel B:  Control for both level and interactions of GDP per capitaCountry Years with census data Migration / Population
Migration College Educated / 
College Educated
Argentina 1970;1980;1991;2001 2.1% 4.4%
Bolivia 1976;1992;2001 3.7% 5.9%
Brazil 1991;2000 1.9% 3.3%
Canada 1971;1981;1991;2001 1.9% 3.2%
Chile 1970;1982;1992;2002 3.3% 6.1%
China 1990 2.0% 8.5%
Colombia 1985;1993;2005 2.3% 2.7%
Ecuador 1990;2001 4.5% 7.4%
France 2006 6.8% 13.4%
Greece 1971;1981;1991;2001 1.4% 4.2%
Indonesia 1976;1980;1985;1990;1995;2000;2005;2010 0.4% 1.3%
Malaysia 1991;2000 3.2% 10.6%
Mexico 1990;1995;2000;2005;2010 0.9% 1.6%
Mongolia 2000 27.8% 55.1%
Morocco 2004 4.0% 9.6%
Nepal 2001 1.6% 9.7%
Nicaragua 1971;1995;2005 1.8% 3.2%
Peru 2007 7.2% 12.5%
Philippines 2000 3.0% 3.8%
Portugal 1991;2001 1.2% 5.0%
South Africa 2001 4.6% 11.0%
Spain 1991 5.8% 13.5%
Switzerland 1970;1980;1990;2000 2.0% 3.6%
United States 1960;1970;1980;1990;2000 2.4% 3.6%
Uruguay 1975;1985;1996;2006 1.8% 5.0%
Vietnam 1989;1999;2009 1.1% 2.3%
All 3.8% 8.1%
Migration / Population
Migration College 
Educated / College 
Educated
ln(density) -0.0009 -0.0038
b
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Temperature 0.0001 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0005)
ln(Reg GDP pc / Ctry GDP pc) 0.0124
b 0.0062
(0.0046) (0.0038)
Constant 0.0291
a 0.0568
a
(0.0061) (0.0090)
Number of Observations 1,380 1,369
Adjusted R
2 62% 68%
Fixed Effect Ctry Ctry
Dependent Variable:
Panel B:  OLS Regressions
Table 6: Migration between regions
Panel A:  Raw DataNone Ln(GDP pc)
Financial 
Regulation
Trade Labor
Transf / 
Gov 
Gov / GDP
Yrs Educ 
(Regional)
ln(density) -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0022
a -0.0020
a -0.0031
a 0.0021 0.0018 -0.0021
c
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0041) (0.0031) (0.0011)
Temperature 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0002)
ln(Reg GDP pc / Ctry GDP pc) 0.0124
a 0.0127
a 0.0106
a 0.0114
a 0.0133
a 0.0148
b 0.0135
a 0.0112
a
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0062) (0.0047) (0.0030)
Control Variable 0.0125
a 0.0106
a 0.0094
a
0.0218 0.0018 0.0133 0.0043
a
(0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0143) (0.0071) (0.0233) (0.0005)
Constant 0.0291
a -0.0834
a 0.0253
a 0.0233
a 0.0299
a 0.0289 0.0183 -0.0004
(0.0040) (0.0138) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0102) (0.0247) (0.0200) (0.0064)
Number of Observations 1,380 1,380 1,085 1,213 630 322 425 1,234
Adjusted R
2 62% 62% 51% 47% 52% 62% 63% 62%
Fixed Effect Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry Ctry
Table 6: Migration between regions (continued)
Panel  C:  Regressions with country-fixed-effects
Control Variable:(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(GDP pc Region) -0.0423
a -0.1066
a -0.1141
a -0.1136
a
(0.0066) (0.0078) (0.0097) (0.0102)
Ln(GDP pc Country) 0.0861
a 0.0768
a 0.0528
a
(0.0079) (0.0113) (0.0162)
Ln(Population density) 0.0302
a 0.0119
a 0.0059 -0.0085
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0088) (0.0090)
Years of Education 0.0049
c 0.0022
(0.0029) (0.0031)
Constant 0.2770
a 0.1441
a 0.2849
a 0.4970
a
(0.0455) (0.0310) (0.0712) (0.1425)
Observations 7,776 7,776 6,655 6,655
Number Regions 1,503 1,503 1,482 1,482
Within R
2
15% 27% 28% 35%
Fixed Effects Region Region Region
Region & 
Year
Table7: Robustness
Panel A:  Regional fixed effects;  Driscoll standard errors(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(GDP pc Ctry) -0.0293
a -0.0301
a -0.0456
a -0.0432
a
(0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0050)
Ln(GDP pc World) 0.0134
b
0.0064 -0.0141
(0.0065) (0.0108) (0.0100)
Years Education 0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0037
c
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0020)
1/(life expectancy at birth) -0.8026 -1.0569
(1.2028) (1.2522)
Fertility -0.0341
a -0.0337
a
(0.0084) (0.0083)
Law and Order 0.0161
c
0.0141
(0.0095) (0.0107)
Investment-to-GDP ratio 0.0815
a 0.0838
a
(0.0192) (0.0199)
Government-consumption-to-GDP ratio -0.1627
a -0.1355
a
(0.0451) (0.0463)
Openess 0.0267
a 0.0228
a
(0.0060) (0.0063)
(Change in terms of trade) x Openess 0.0343 0.0270
(0.0258) (0.0253)
Democracy 0.0116
b
0.0072
(0.0056) (0.0051)
Democracy Squared -0.0009
b -0.0006
c
(0.0004) (0.0003)
Inflation -0.0035
a -0.0032
a
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Constant 0.1536
a 0.2112
a 0.5535
a 0.4334
a
(0.0424) (0.0756) (0.0917) (0.0431)
Observations 868 868 868 868
Adjusted R
2
12% 12% 28% 32%
Countries 89 89 89 89
Within R2 12% 12% 29% 33%
Between R2 14% 13% 1% 2%
Fixed effects Country Country Country Country & Yr
Panel B:  National GDP;  Country fixed effects